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ANTITRUST SUITS BY FOREIGN NATIONS
Lawrence R. Velvel*
The purpose of this nation's antitrust laws is to promote competition in
American commerce.' But although the Sherman and Clayton Acts specifically cover foreign as well as domestic commerce, 2 surprisingly few occasions
have arisen in which foreign nations or citizens, injured by violations
occurring in United States foreign commerce, have brought suit against
3
American corporations to recover for such injuries.
Recently, however, foreign nations have brought suit on behalf of themselves and their citizens against United States corporations for antitrust
violations. In the Antibiotic Cases, a massive, textbook example of antitrust litigation, 4 five major drug companies have been accused of violating
* Professor, Catholic University Law School. B.A., 1960, J.D., 1963, University of
Michigan. The author has represented several foreign nations in the Antibiotic Cases. In
these cases, he has argued that a foreign nation is a "person" entitled to sue for treble
damages under the antitrust laws and that a foreign government should be permitted to
sue as the official representative of its citizens' antitrust claims.
1. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, FINAL REPORT 1

(1955).

2. For example, section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "[e]very contract,
combination .. . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations ....",15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), while section 2 prohibits
monopolizing, conspiring to monopolize, or attempting to monopolize "any part of the
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations . . .", id. § 2.
3. It appears that the only prior antitrust cases involving a foreign nation as a
plaintiff were part of the Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases in the early 1960's. In
these cases, the Republic of India, a corporation created by the Indian Parliament and
wholly owned by the government, and several government-owned public utilities of the
states of India joined as plaintiffs. Although these cases were settled prior to trial,
preliminary motions to dismiss plaintiffs for lack of standing were filed, argued, and
denied. For a general discussion of the Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases, see
Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases-TheirImplications for Government and
for Business, 29 U. CHI.L. REV. 97 (1961).
4. The Antibiotic Cases have involved over 160 plaintiffs, including nearly every
state in the Union, insurance companies, health and welfare plans, competitors of the
defendants, and foreign nations. Many of the cases have already been settled, see, e.g.,
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 87
(1971) ($100 million fund established settling large number of claims), while a number
of cases are currently at trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, and still others are in the pretrial stages.
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the antitrust laws in their sale of broad spectrum antibiotic drugs. In addition
to a wide variety of domestic plaintiffs, several foreign nations have joined
the litigation. 5
Besides the numerous procedural 6 and substantive 7 issues already involved, the participation of foreign nations in the Antibiotic Cases has
given rise to two questions which until now have been exceptionally rare or
even novel in American antitrust jurisprudence. The first is whether a
foreign government is a "person" within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act s and can therefore recover treble damages for violations of the
antitrust laws. The second is whether a foreign government can sue as the
official representative of claims of its nationals who are clearly "persons"
within the meaning of the Clayton Act. 9
While these questions have been extremely rare in the past, they are
extremely important to a determination of the reach of the antitrust laws.
Their significance is heightened by the probability that violations of the
antitrust laws have been reasonably widespread in foreign commerce,
especially since the advent of multinational corporations. Moreover, the fact
that nine foreign governments brought suit in the Antibiotic Cases, 10 the first
time a significant number have ever done so, indicates that in the future
sovereign governments may wish to pursue an antitrust remedy against
violations of law which have caused harm to themselves and their citizens.
United States District Judge Miles W. Lord'" has decided both the
"person" and the official representative questions in favor of the foreign
governments. In ruling on the "person" issue in 1971, the court in In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.)' 2 stated that there
5. Kuwait became the first foreign government to sue in the Antibiotic Cases when
it filed its complaint in 1969, and was followed by eight others between 1969 and 1974.
See note 10 infra.
6. Procedural issues have included questions of venue, standing, class actions, and
discovery. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
7. Plaintiffs' allegations included charges of price fixing, monopolization, and fraudulent procurement and misuse of patents. For a description of the background of this
litigation, see Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 533-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

406 U.S.976 (1972).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
9. Id. § 12.
10. The nine governments were India, West Germany, Spain, Vietnam, Columbia,
Iran, the Philippines, Korea and Kuwait.
11. Sitting by assignment, Judge Lord of the United States District Court of the
District of Minnesota heard the case in the Southern District of New York. Later,
however, the case was transferred to Minnesota; hence, the appeal went to the Eighth
Circuit. See note 12 infra.
12. 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), petition for mandamus dismissed sub nom.
Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Lord, Civil No. 74-1680 (8th Cir., Aug. 27, 1975).
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is little of relevance on the issue in the legislative history of either the
Sherman or Clayton Acts; the real question, according to the court, "is
whether the maintenance of the action is essential to the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws."' Stressing that "'the most important thing to
keep in mind is the result orientation with which the [Supreme] Court has
approached the whole area of private treble-damage litigation,' ",14 the court
found that actions by foreign nations were essential to antitrust enforcement
because of the close relationship between domestic and foreign markets.' 5 It
found that a conspiracy to eliminate competition in foreign sales would
adversely effect domestic competition; that domestic manufacturers could
build up a "war chest" from excessive profits from foreign sales; and that
"the fundamental goal of the antitrust laws could be seriously frustrated by
not permitting the foreign government to maintain a treble damage action
"16

The District Court decided the official representative issue in Republic of
Vietnam v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 7 in June 1974. Pointing out that it was not
disputed that individual foreign citizens themselves have claims under section
4, the court ruled that damage suits by foreign governments on behalf of
their citizens are not barred on the ground that domestic states of the union
cannot sue to recover damages on behalf of their citizens.' The court
reasoned that suits by domestic states on behalf of individual citizens could
subject defendants to multiple damages if and when the individuals also
brought suit, but if the state's suit were held to bar individual claims, its suit
might amount to a taking of citizens' property without due process. It was for
these reasons that prior courts had been reluctant to permit domestic states to
sue on behalf of their citizens.' 9
The court pointed out, however, that these problems do not exist when a
foreign nation asserts the damage claims of its citizens. The relationships
between a foreign government and its citizens are not restricted by the
13. 333 F. Supp. at 316.
14. Id. at 316, quoting West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d
Cir. 1971).
15. 333 F. Supp. at 316-17.
16. Id.
17. Civil No. 74-1847 (D. Minn., June 17, 1974). When this article was written, the
District Court's decision on the "person" and representative issues were being appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit's decision
was handed down just before the article went to press. Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Lord, Civil
No. 74-1680 (8th Cir., Aug. 27, 1975). The decision is discussed in an addendum to the
article.
18. ld. at 7.
19. Id. Domestic states, however, have recovered on behalf of their citizens in
antitrust class actions. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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American Constitution. 20 In the Antibiotic Cases, foreign governments are
asserting the right to litigate claims of their citizens and to 'apply any
'2 1
proceeds from the litigation to the benefit of their citizens as a whole.'
Since the consequences of this are
that the claims may no longer be asserted by the individuals themselves, the defendants need no longer fear a double recovery. And
since constitutional restrictions upon such takings by state governments do not apply to foreign governments, the reasons for denying
states the power to bring such lawsuits do not apply to the case at
22
hand.
This article will review the arguments supporting and opposing the standing of a foreign nation to bring suit. The first section will include the all-important economic arguments involved in addressing this question. The second
section will detail the legal issues related to whether a foreign government can
obtain recovery for its own injuries. The final portion of the article will
discuss the issue of whether a foreign nation can obtain recovery for its
citizens' injuries.
I. ANTITRUST, ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES
BEARING ON SUITS BY FOREIGN NATIONS

Standing to bring an action for treble damages under section 4 of the
Clayton Act is conferred upon any "person" within the meaning of the
Act.2 3 If the courts were to rule that a foreign government is not such a
"person", then treble damage actions would be excised from the antitrust laws
in regard to purchases by such governments. The segment of commerce in
which actions would be precluded is a large and growing one, since today
there are many nations with large public sectors performing business functions which previously were within the domain of private entities. Among
such countries are India, Great 'Britain, the Scandinavian nations, West
Germany, Israel, and France, a list which, particularly when further fleshed
out, includes major allies and trading partners as well as vital underdeveloped
countries. Included in the public sectors are such vital industries as medicine,
steel, automobiles, and aircraft.
In addition, if foreign governments cannot sue as representatives of the
antitrust claims of their citizens, then in effect treble damage actions will also
be excised from another large share of foreign commerce represented by
20. Civil No. 74-1847 at 8.
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id.
23. Section 1 of the Clayton Act provides that the term "person" encompasses corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the law of any foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
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purchases of foreign nationals. While foreign nationals clearly can maintain
claims under section 4,24 as a practical matter they are often unable to
pursue such claims themselves. Extreme geographical distance, lack of the
large amounts of money necessary to hire American antitrust lawyers (and
lack of the necessary foreign exchange with which to pay them), ignorance of
antitrust laws, language difficulties, and other factors combine to preclude
suits by all but the wealthiest and most sophisticated foreign individuals and
corporations. 25 The question thus arises whether it is consistent with antitrust, economic, or diplomatic policy to excise treble damage actions from a
major share of United State foreign commerce.
A.

Antitrust Principles

The Supreme Court has stated that the "[a]ntitrust laws in general, and
the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms." ' 26 Treble damage actions are a vitally important method
of enforcing the antitrust laws; it is widely considered that they are the most
effective of the various methods, 27 and, indeed, some feel that they are the
only effective method.28 Given the importance to the economy of antitrust
24. The Department of Justice has stated that "the right of foreign nationals,
corporations and associations to maintain an action for treble damages has never been
seriously contested." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions (Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.), 333 F. Supp. 315 (D.Minn. 1971).
Indeed, this right was not contested by the defendants in the Antibiotic Cases.
25. Even given the availability of American antitrust litigation to large foreign
corporations and to most foreign governments for injuries suffered by the latter, for the
vast bulk of foreign claimants resort to American courts would not be practicable. Thus
foreign individuals, small and medium sized foreign businesses, such as importers or
wholesalers, and other foreign nationals would be precluded from recovering damages.
Even if American antitrust suits were within the reach of a great many more foreign
nationals, it seems doubtful that more than a few of them could take the time and effort
for repeated trips to the United States for the extended discovery that antitrust suits
entail.
26. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
27. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS
178 (1974).
28. For many years the antitrust laws have also been enforceable by jail sentences of
up to one year, fines of up to $50,000, and injunctions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). These
means of enforcement, however, proved to be of little effect. The monetary penalties
were so small as to be laughable in the eyes of multibillion dollar corporations, and jail
sentences were rarely, if ever, imposed. Moreover, future injunctions held no terror
sufficient to deter lucrative violations. But cf. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURIsDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
So inefficient were the existing penalties that Congress, spurred by rampant inflation
in general and, more specifically, by a four-fold increase in the price of sugar within
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principles and the vital nature of treble damage actions as a means of
enforcement, the Supreme Court has repeatedly eschewed defenses which
would vitiate the impact of treble damage actions across a wide spectrum of
commerce. For example, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts
Corp.,20 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause these rulings by
the Court of Appeals seemed to threaten the effectiveness of the private
action as a vital means for enforcing the antitrust policy of the United States
..".3. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court stated that "the
purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws."'

Similarly, in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,3 2 the
Court struck down a defense which would have negated treble damage
actions. It pointed out that permitting the use of the passing-on defense
would result in suits having to be brought by those with
• ..only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting
a class action. In consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws
by price fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their
illegality because no one was available who would bring suit against
them. Treble-damage actions, the importance of which the Court
a year, substantially increased the penalties for antitrust violations in the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act § 3, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-3 (Supp. Feb., 1975), amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). The Act upgrades antitrust violations from misdemeanors to
felonies, id. § 3(1); provides that the fine for corporations can be imposed up to $1
million, id. § 3(2); provides that fines for noncorporate violators can be imposed up to
$100,000, id., and that jail sentences may be increased to as long as three years, id. §
3(3). Whether this new law will be any more effective than the old one remains to be
seen. A multibillion dollar corporation making tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
from antitrust violations is no more likely to be deterred by a possible fine of $1 million
than by one of $50,000. Similarly, if an executive is engaged in a violation so lucrative
that he is not deterred by the possibility of a potential $50,000 fine, he also may be
undeterred by a possible $100,000 fine. Finally, it is hard to see why the lengthening of
potential jail sentences will necessarily make a difference. Most executives do not wish to
go to jail for one day or one month, let alone for one year. Yet the previous one year
potential sentence seems not to have been a deterrent since the risk that a jail sentence
would actually be imposed was minimal. If judges were unwilling to sentence corporate
executives to jail sentences when those sentences were a year or less, it is difficult to
believe that they will now use their discretion to send white collar antitrust violators to
jail for three years. Indeed, judges may now be more reluctant to impose any jail
sentences at all, since the increase in allowable penalties would permit them to "sufficiently" punish antitrust violators by increased fines rather than by imprisonment.
29. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 139.
32. 392 U.S.481 (1968).
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has many times emphasized, would be substantially reduced in
3
effectiveness. 1
Thus, antitrust principles espoused by the Court argue against permitting
treble damage actions to be nullified in a vast area of foreign commerce.
Moreover, given the possible ineffectiveness of other means of enforcement
of antitrust policies, 34 such nullification might be viewed as tantamount to
repealing the antitrust laws by implication in foreign commerce; repeal by
implication, it need hardly be added, is highly disfavored in antitrust
35
jurisprudence.
B.

Economic Considerations

Since economic considerations are in significant part the moving forces
behind the antitrust laws,3 6 it would be helpful to determine whether important economic goals would be furthered or hindered by a rule that foreign
nations cannot be plaintiffs in antitrust actions. It seems clear that a rule
prohibiting treble damage suits by foreign sovereigns would not only fail to
promote the economic goals furthered by the antitrust laws, but it would run
contrary to them and could have an overall detrimental impact upon the
domestic American economy.
Granting immunity from treble damage actions in a large share of foreign
commerce encourages anticompetitive conspiracies, with monopolistically high
prices, in such commerce. These high prices in foreign sales can contribute to
world inflation, which may in turn contribute to inflation in the United States.
For price levels in American export trade have a truly vast effect on price
levels within other countries and in international trade in general, and the
latter price levels in turn have a vital impact upon United States price levels.
Given the rampaging nature of inflation throughout the world and the
repeated calls by Congress, the President and other members of the executive branch for the use of antitrust as an important tool against inflation, 7
the times hardly seem propitious for an interpretation of the antitrust laws
which would fuel inflation by encouraging monopolistic price-fixing conspiracies in foreign commerce.
33. Id. at 494.
34. See note 28 supra.
35. The Supreme Court has made it clear that exemptions from the antitrust laws will
not be found by implication, but must be expressly stated by Congress. Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973). Moreover, even
express exemptions will be narrowly construed to avoid limiting or repealing the scope of
the antitrust laws more than is necessary. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
36. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFsKY, H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 1-16, 21-28 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Legislative Outlook for the 94th Congress, ANTITRUST & TRADE REo.
REP. No. 696, B1, Jan. 14, 1975.
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Another way in which inflation may be exacerbated by nullifying treble
damage actions arises in situations in which companies possessing significant
monopoly power feel able to and do conspire to fix prices in worldwide
foreign commerce and are aided in establishing and maintaining a floor
under a monopolistically high and inflationary price level within the United
States itself. This result occurs because a worldwide conspiracy, so long as it
remains effective, eliminates the possibility that foreign suppliers may seek to
enter the American market with competitive prices that are beneath the
existing domestic price level.
Finally, domestic inflation can be aided by a corporation's accumulation
of a large "war chest". 38 If corporations are immune from damage actions
on huge amounts of foreign sales, then such sales can be used to build
enormous "war chests" for the purpose of establishing and policing domestic
conspiracies and for defending them from antitrust attacks. The conspiracies
so established will have an obvious inflationary impact on the domestic price
level.
In addition to the battle against inflation, the achievement of other
economic goals might also be endangered by immunizing conspiracies in
foreign commerce. For example, purchases of American goods by foreign
entities create a large volume of foreign sales vital to the economic health of
the United States. But by encouraging monopolistically high prices on such
sales, immunity from treble damage actions may diminish the American
export market. Moreover, by causing a lessened foreign demand,3 9 monopolistically high prices could be detrimental to the United States balance of
40
payments.
38. See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.), 333 F.
Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

39. Export markets can be lessened even for commodities normally thought to be
essential but which are obtainable only from domestic suppliers. Demand for a product is
never completely inelastic; at some point the price of even an allegedly necessary product
will be so high that buyers will forego its purchase. When sales abroad are at monopoly
prices, then even though the monopolist may make more profit than under competitive
conditions, his total revenue, and the total of United States foreign sales, may be less
than under competitive conditions.
40. There is at least one other way in which the weakening of the antitrust laws,
caused by excising treble damage actions of foreign nations, might be harmful to
American economic interests. This concerns the question of confidence-that indispensable element so necessary to a high level of business activity. The questions of whether
there can be redress when foreign nations and citizens have been harmed by a violation
of the antitrust laws can be one measure of whether foreign governments, investors, and
purchasers will receive fair and equal treatment under American law. If they feel
confident of receiving generally fair treatment, they will be encouraged to invest much
needed capital in the United States and to purchase goods and services here. Conversely,
if they feel that foreign countries and citizens will not receive even-handed treatment,
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C.

Diplomatic Considerations

The Supreme Court has often stressed that principles of comity require
that foreign governments be permitted to bring claims in the courts of the
United States. 4 ' So strong is the policy of comity that the privilege of bringing
claims has even been extended to countries with which the United States has
manifestly unfriendly relations, such as Cuba, 42 and has been denied only to
governments at war with the United States. A judicial denial of suit by
foreign countries, the Court has said, is pregnant with sensitive political
problems and the possibility of hindering the Executive in its conduct of
43
foreign relations.
'Principles of comity thus argue for permitting foreign governments to bring
antitrust claims on their own behalf and on behalf of their citizens. 44 If this
right were denied, foregin nations may take umbrage if they and their
citizens could be mulcted by American corporations without hope of remedy,
though domestic parties harmed in the same way by the same corporations
could recover antitrust damages. Furthermore, the Congress and the Executive have themselves urged foreign nations to participate in measures against
anticompetitive conduct, and the bringing of antitrust suits would certainly
constitute such a measure. The Bretton Woods Agreement Act 45 urges
foreign nations to take steps "which will best reduce obstacles to and
restrictions upon international trade" and which will "eliminate unfair trade
practices" in international trade. 46 Various treaties between the United
States and other nations have urged aid-recipient nations "to take appropriate measures singly and in cooperation with other countries to eliminate
public or private restrictive practices hindering domestic or international
trade."' 47 A similar policy is embodied in various aid agreements entered into
48
by the 'United States.
foreign nations and their nationals may be reluctant to invest or purchase in the United
States.
41. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964);
The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870).

42. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
43. Id. at 408-12.
44. If it be argued that comity principles giving a right to institute suit do not entail

underlying substantive principles giving a basis for recovery, the clear answer is that a
procedural right to sue is useless without underlying substantive rights upon which to
recover.
45. 22U.S.C. §§ 286-286k-1 (1970).
46. Id. § 286k.

47. See, e.g., Economic Cooperation Agreement with the Government of Vietnam,
Sept. 7, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 2205, 2207, T.I.A.S. No. 2346.

48. See, e.g., The Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with the Republic of
Vietnam, April 3, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
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In view of such urgings, it would be a particularly inappropriate violation
of rules of comity, and directly opposed to the foreign policies expressed by
the political branches of government, for courts to close their doors to
antitrust suits brought by foreign countries to remedy restrictive anticompetitive practices.
D. Economic and Foreign Relations Reasons Against Permitting
Suits by Foreign Nations
Retaliatory Action By Foreign Governments. Several major economic and
foreign relations arguments have been suggested for denying foreign governments the right to bring antitrust damage suits. First, foreign governments
could take various retaliatory steps to deal with antitrust violations from
which they suffer, including seizures of goods, increases in tariff barriers,
withdrawals of licenses to do business, and refusals to recognize patents. This
proposal for retributive policies, however, may be an open invitation to
economic chaos for other nations, for the United States, and for American
corporations, including those multinational corporations which have sponsored the suggestion. One can imagine the havoc that would be created if, in
retribution for having lost millions of dollars due to antitrust violations
committed by multinational American corporations, foreign countries began
confiscating these companies' assets, or denying them the right to do
business.
A similar suggestion is that foreign nations could act by criminal or civil
suits in their own courts. Even if such suits were practicable, however, the
existence of such alternative remedies would not vitiate a foreign country's
right to redress under American antitrust laws. Domestic states of the union
have their own antitrust laws, but this does not prevent them from obtaining
49
treble damages under the federal laws.
-In any event, criminal or civil suits by foreign countries are often very
impracticable. It can and does happen that anticompetitive activities, such as
illegal patent actions and unlawful agreements to divide markets, take place
entirely within the United States. 0 Also, in some instances the defendant
companies are operated and located entirely within the United States, and
the locus of their sales to foreigners is in the United States. In such cases, the
foreign nations would find it difficult or impossible to obtain jurisdiction as a
legal or practical matter. Even in cases in which it might be possible to
49. See pp. 20-22 infra, discussing rights of domestic states and the federal govern-

ment to bring antitrust suits.
50. Because the anticompetitive conduct occurs so far from their shores, foreign
countries may not even discover it until very late, if at all.
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obtain jurisdiction, the witnesses and documents are in the United States,
making it very difficult to conduct discovery or trial in a foreign land.
Differing Views Toward Antitrust. Another suggestion is that foreign
countries should have no right of action under the antitrust laws because
many of them have a very different view of competition and antitrust than
does the United States. Of course, there are many foreign countries, including major allies and trading partners in the Common Market, with antitrust
views similar to our own.5 1 Such countries should not be denied redress
because there are other nations with differing views. If courts were somehow
to devise the amazing rule that a nation is a "person" if it substantially
agrees with our antitrust principles but not if it disagrees with them, then the
judiciary would be given the impossible task of deciding the differing extents
to which various countries agree or disagree with our notions of competition.
This could only be productive of confusion and bad foreign relations.
Furthermore, Congress' desire to protect foreign commerce under the antitrust laws indicates that, regardless of a foreign nation's view toward antitrust, the foreign commerce of the United States is best served by permitting
52
recovery by a foreign nation.
Expansion of Liability. A further argument in opposition to standing for
foreign governments is that it would result in an expansion of the damage
liability faced by violators of the antitrust laws. Of course, in regard to
foreign nationals, who clearly are "persons", there can be no doubt that
defendants are already liable for damages. The only question is whether
there can be a viable method for bringing the claims and collecting the
damages.
The same argument regarding expansion of damages could have been
made in regard to suits by domestic states, yet this did not preclude the
51. Except for Italy, all of the members of the Common Market have antitrust laws.
For a general description of the impact of these laws on United States trade, see
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 380-90 (1975).

52. The Department of Justice agrees with this position. See Brief for the United
States Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Lord, No. 74-1680
(8th Cir., Aug. 27, 1975) ("to the extent that restraints of trade are deterred by the
threat of damage liability, american foreign commerce would be enhanced." Id. at 5).
In addition, a good deal of money could be saved by the United States if these suits
were permitted. Foreign governments regularly buy American goods with money obtained through United States grant and loan programs or through participation in
programs of agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 20 percent of whose loan capacity derives from United States contributions.
Permitting damage suits by foreign nations would increase the competition among
American businesses which export commodities and would assure financial efficiency in
the allocation of American dollars sent abroad through such programs.
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Supreme Court from ruling that they are "persons", 5 8 nor did it stop the
judiciary from permitting states to represent their citizens in class actions. 54
The possibility of recovering a large amount of damages should thus not
defeat standing when excision of a remedy would conflict with Congress'
desire to protect and stimulate commerce by ensuring the triumph of
competitive principles.
If the size of damages precluded suit by plaintiffs, the result would be that
the more widespread the violations of law, the less violators would have to
pay. This perverse consequence would be contrary to Congress' decision that
antitrust violators should pay treble damages for their violations.55
Finally, it may be noted that, as a practical matter, the overwhelming
preponderance of liability is likely to stem not from suits by foreign entities,
but from suits by domestic bodies. This is because, in general, domestic
entities are more likely to bring suit and because American corporations
have greater sales in domestic commerce than in foreign commerce. In the
Antibiotic Cases themselves, suits by domestic parties involved literally
billions of dollars in potential damages.
Impact on Domestic Corporationsand the American Economy. Another
economic argument against recovery by foreign governments contains some
of the same elements as the prior arguments that different countries have
differing views toward antitrust and that recovery would cause an expansion
of liability. The argument is that permitting recovery by numerous foreign
governments would have a disastrous impact on domestic corporate violators
and would result in money being taken out of the United States economy. This
in turn would be detrimental to the public, and is to be avoided particularly
in the current troubled state of the economy.56
53. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
54. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089-90 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).

55. In this regard, the decisions in Securities Exchange Act cases concerning violations of rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), provide an interesting analogue. After
first implying a private remedy for rule lob-5 violations, see, e.g., Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
the courts in later cases have interpreted the rule in such a way as to open defendants to
damages of staggering amounts. It was estimated, for example, that the potential damage
liability of the defendants in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), could be as high as $400 million. See Ruder,
Texas Gulf Sulpher-The Second Round, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 428-29 (1968). In view
of the fact that courts have exposed defendants to this degree of liability in a statutory
scheme in which the remedy has been implied rather than expressed, it would certainly
be inconsistent for the courts to be opposed to large damages in the context of the
express damage provisions of the Clayton Act.
56. In the Antibiotic Cases, one member of the oil cartel, Iran, whose rapidly
increasing prices caused serious harm to our economy, is currently a plaintiff. This raises
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Chauvinistic as the argument may be, at first glance it has appeal to the
American eye and ear. No American wishes to see harm befall our economy
or even any particular American business. But further analysis reveals
considerable weaknesses in this argument. In the first place, to the extent the
argument contains the same elements as the "differing views" and "expansion of liability" arguments, the same answers apply. If domestic violators
are hurt or money goes abroad because of the claims of foreign nationals,
this occurs according to the mandate of Congress, which has clearly ordained
that foreign nationals can possess antitrust claims. Congress has further
ordained that United States foreign commerce will be best served by a
regime of competition in our export markets, a regime furthered by treble
damage recovery.
The claim of economic harm to violators is equally applicable to treble
damage suits by domestic states, yet such suits are permitted. 57 Indeed,
Congress enacted a treble damage remedy because the magnitude of the
damages would deter violators; thus, unless Congress so decrees in the
future, the size of damages should not be a reason to forbid a treble damage
recovery. In any event, the alleged threat of harm to companies or the
economy by foreign recoveries is vastly overblown. In cases involving huge
domestic industries, the amounts recovered are likely to be only a small
percentage of the defendants' income and assets. Additionally, even though
export sales are vital to the economy, they are only a relatively small
percentage of total United States economic activity. 58 The vast bulk of
potential liability will thus continue to be in the domestic, not the foreign,
area.
Finally, any claim of a widespread threat amounts to a defense that
immunity must be granted because violations are so widespread. Bad enough
in itself, such a defense comes with particular ill grace when corporations
the possibility of recovery by a nation which has harmed the domestic economy by
anticompetitive conduct. Such a state of affairs might lead a court to think it masochistic
to permit such a nation to recover. However, a blanket denial of standing to all foreign
governments would approach throwing the baby out with the bath water; it would not
only deny recovery to members of the oil cartel, but it would also penalize major allies
and trading partners, such as West Germany, whose views of antitrust are similar to our
own and who suffer at least equally at the hands of the oil cartel.
57. It is true that one reason the United States itself is limited to single damages for
antitrust injuries is that treble damages might harm companies from which it is the major
buyer-a rather common phenomenon in our economy. Foreign nations, however, are
not nearly so likely to be the major buyer from a domestic corporation, and export sales
are only a small percentage of our total economy.
58. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
373 (95th ed. 1974).
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have made huge amounts of money by violating the law, and could have
escaped liability simply by following the law.5 9
Moreover, the second half of the argument, based on the removal of money
from the economy ("removal-harm") by way of treble damage actions, re,
quires an even stronger response, for it is at odds with the most basic economic principle concerning competition and antitrust. The basic economic
principle which undergirds the antitrust laws asserts that the maximum
amount of goods will ,be produced at the cheapest cost and price if there is
competition in the economy. It is in this way that the maximum economic
and social good is achieved. To the extent that economic performance is
highly oligopolistic or monopolistic, less goods will be produced, with higher
costs and prices and lessened social utility.
The short of the matter is that the economy in general and the economic
health of individuals would be better served under competition than under
some other regime. Nor do these principles stop at the water's edge.
American export trade and world trade in general would be maximized by
competitive behavior which gives full play to the comparative economic
advantages possessed by the export industries of both the 'United States and
other nations. If American goods are priced competitively, if they are priced
in accordance with their costs instead of at a high and artificially fixed
monopoly price, then more American goods will be sold abroad, with
consequent benefits to the domestic economy. If American exports are priced
at monopolistic levels, the amount of exports would eventually decline; at
least it would be less than if competitive prices were in force. 60
In seeking to diminish the efficacy of competitive principles in American
foreign trade, the "removal-harm" argument thus adopts a view concerning
our economic welfare which is contrary to that adopted by Congress in the
antitrust laws. 6 1 It takes a view which is certainly incorrect in the long run,
59. Cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), in
which the Court rejected the "passing on" defense because it would enable defendants to
"retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would bring suit

against them." Id. at 494; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968) (rejecting the in pari delicto defense).
60. An exception to this could occur when an American exporter possesses an
absolutely essential product which foreign nations lacked the technology or materials to
produce, or to produce in sufficient quantities. In that situation, foreign nations would
have to choose between paying monopolistic prices or doing without the product. In the
long run, however, the utilization of monopoly prices will give to foreign nations an
increased incentive to discover the technology or to find alternative sources of materials
so that they may become self-sufficient. The response of the oil importing nations to the
current prices of petroleum is the most apparent recent example.
61. The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970), which excludes certain
conduct of export associations from the reach of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal
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since it would stifle trade just as surely as it is stifled by taxes or tariffs
which, like price fixing, raise the price of a product. Nor is it even correct in
the short run, in these troubled times for the domestic economy. For
whether we are thinking in broad terms of ways to enlarge our economy or
in narrow terms of ways to pay for foreign oil, the goal must be to find
methods of increasing exports, not stifling them. Indeed, with respect to
United States industries which exhibit pronounced oligopolistic practices such
as high and noncompetitive prices, it would be particularly ill advised to
adopt rules which would be harmful to export trade by removing stimuli to
competition, efficiency, and lower prices.
Additionally, in economic terms the "removal-harm" argument confuses
cause and effect in regard to the difficulties now being experienced by the
economy. It implies that economic troubles mean that an antitrust stimulus to
competition should be negated, while in fact it is an absence of effective
competition which is in some degree responsible for these troubles in the first
place. As previously mentioned, anticompetitive price fixing conspiracies
which establish a monopoly price in foreign commerce contribute to world
and domestic inflation. Inflation in turn is partly responsible for decreased
investment, increased unemployment, tight money and a variety of other
economic ills. The way to cure this is not to encourage more of the very
kinds of action which contribute to the trouble. The proper course is to
discourage inflationary anticompetitive actions by encouraging suits which
promote competition. Certainly this is the theory which has been advanced
by the President and Congress in their calls for more effective antitrust
enforcement, and also by economists and others who are regularly lambasting the regulatory agencies and the regulated industries for anticompetitive
actions which raise the cost of living. 62
There are further deficiencies in the "removal-harm" argument. To
contend that treble damage recoveries by foreign nations would drain the
domestic economy neglects the fact that a third of those damages were
unfairly brought into this country when foreign nations and their citizens
purchased goods at artificially high prices from domestic corporations. Furthermore, a major portion of any recovery would often be spent in the United
Trade Commission Acts, constitutes a limited exception in which Congress apparently
felt that a form of cartel would abet foreign trade and economic welfare. But the general
rule, nevertheless, is that competition is the most effective way to maximize economic
benefits in both foreign and domestic commerce. It is also noteworthy that, in a kind of
reverse twist, the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act was intended to reemphasize that,
except when the Act applies, the normal antitrust rules shall prevail in foreign commerce.
62. See, e.g., Editorial, Kicking Off Deregulation, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7,
1975, at 6, col. 1; The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
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States to purchase needed American goods and commodities.6 Indeed, it
might be possible for a court to guard against an outflow of dollars by
requiring that recoveries be spent in the United States.
Finally, insofar as the "removal-harm" argument asserts that recovery by
foreign nations is to be avoided in these troubled economic times, to this
extent it rests upon economic vicissitudes. Clearly, as a legal matter, it is
erroneous to classify a foreign nation as a "person" in good times but not in
bad. It is either a "person" in both sets of circumstances or in neither. A
temporary set of economic circumstances should not be a reason for denying
recovery.
II.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES BEARING ON WHETHER A FOREIGN
NATION IS A "PERSON"

Whether a foreign government may sue as a "person" for treble damages
based on its own injuries raises a host of legal questions. Arguments may be
made on either side of the issue, and the result can depend upon the basic
approach one takes toward the antitrust laws. If antitrust is perceived as a
useful deterrent to anticompetitive conduct and therefore worthy of broad
interpretation, there is ample support for a conclusion that foreign nations
are legitimate antitrust plaintiffs. ,If, on the other hand, antitrust law is
viewed as an unsatisfactory inroad upon businessmen's freedom of conduct,
there is support for limiting the reach of antitrust laws. Given the generally
accepted high place of the antitrust laws and competition in our economy, it
seems that the more cogent reasons argue for holding that foreign nations
can be antitrust plaintiffs.
A.

Lack of CongressionalIntent to Exclude Foreign Governments

The Statutory Language and its Legislative History. Among the arguments
supporting a foreign nation's right to sue as a "person" are those which do so

in a negative fashion, that is, by showing that Congress did not exclude
foreign governments from the list of "persons" who can be plaintiffs or that
Congress did not desire that the right of suit be narrowly confined. In this
regard, section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble damage remedy to any

person injured in his business or property by a violation of the antitrust
laws, 64 and the word "person" is defined by section 1 of the Act to "include

corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
. . .any foreign country."6 5 The wording of the section 1 definition places
no limitation upon the word "person". It does not give a narrow, preclusive
63. Conversely, there can be no assurance that, when domestic plaintiffs recover, they
will not use the money to purchase goods abroad.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
65. Id. § 12.
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definition; it does not say that the word person means certain entities and
only those entities. Rather, it simply says that "person" is deemed to include
certain entities, without excluding other entities. It has long been accepted
that there is a significant difference between a statutory definition which says
that a word shall mean a certain thing which is thereafter stated, and a
definition saying that a word shall include certain entities. 66
It is thus clear from the statutory language that foreign governments are
not excluded from the Clayton Act's definition of "person". The same
inference can be drawn from the legislative history, for the exclusion of
foreign governments from the definition of "person" nowhere appears in the
67
history.
CongressionalAction. A variety of congressional actions have indicated an
intention that the right to sue to enforce the antitrust laws not be narrowly
limited. For example, in 1904 the Supreme Court ruled in Minnesota v.
Northern Securities Co.6 8 that a domestic state could not sue for an
injunction under the antitrust laws. Congress acted to reverse this restrictive
reading of the antitrust laws by enacting section 16 of the Clayton Act,
giving the right to injunctive relief to any "person, firm, corporation or
association" threatened by a violation of the antitrust laws. 6 9
Another example of congressional action to reverse restrictive readings of
the antitrust laws arose after the Court's decision in United States v. Cooper
Corp.,70 holding that the United States was not a "person" entitled to
maintain suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act. This decision was overruled
in 1955 by the enactment of section 4a of the Act,71 granting the federal
government the right to sue for actual damages. The limitation of recovery to
single damages was not, however, the manifestation of a congressional
decision that suits by sovereigns generally did not require the recovery of
treble recoveries; it was primarily a recognition that the United States,
66. See, e.g., Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121 (1934), in which, in reference
to section 200(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1926, the Court wrote that the
terms "means" and "includes" are not necessarily synonymous. . . . The natural distinction would be where "means" is employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb "includes" imports
a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the
definition.
Id. at 125 n.1. Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1941).
67. See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Cases (Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.) 333 F. Supp.
315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
68.

194 U.S. 48 (1904).

69. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
70. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970).
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already charged with the obligation of enforcing the laws, did not need the
additional spur of a treble damage recovery.7 2 At the same time, however,
Congress recognized that other parties may need this spur to bring large,
expensive and time consuming antitrust cases. Foreign governments, not
legally charged with enforcing American antitrust laws, would be encouraged
to bring suit if they were allowed to recover treble damages and attorneys'
fees in an action brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Since Congress has affirmatively acted to overrule decisions which narrow
the right to bring suit, particularly serious import attaches to the fact that in
1914 Congress did not act to overrule decisions which had permitted suit by
foreign governmental entities. Between 1890, when Congress first enacted
the definition of "person" in the Sherman Act, and 1914, when it reenacted
precisely the same definition in section 1 of the Clayton Act, a number of
antitrust-type, unfair competition suits were brought in United States courts
by foreign cities and nations. 78 Given this fact, one would expect Congress to
have decreed in 1914 that a foreign government is not a "person" entitled to
sue, if such had been the legislative wish. This reasoning is buttressed by
the fact that 1914 was also the year in which Congress enacted the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 74 banning acts of unfair competition, the very kinds
of acts at issue in the foreign nation suits occurring between 1890 and 1914.
B.

CongressionalIntent to Include ForeignGovernments

The Protection of Foreign Commerce. In addition to the foregoing points,
there are also a number of positive points of statutory construction which
demonstrate in an affirmative fashion that the word "person" does include

foreign governments. To begin with, Congress clearly intended the antitrust
laws to apply to the foreign commerce of the United States. Both section 1
and section 2 of the Sherman Act forbid anticompetitive acts in "commerce
• . . with foreign nations,' 75 and section 1 of the Clayton Act defines
commerce as encompassing "commerce. . . with foreign nations. ' 76 Today,
of course, purchases by foreign governments directly as well as through
foreign governmental entities constitute a large amount of United States
72. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
73. See, e.g., French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La
Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 94 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F. 153 (2d Cir.
1900); City of Carlsbad v. Kutnow, 68 F. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1895), aft'd, 71 F. 167 (2d
Cir. 1895).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
75. Id. §§ 1, 2.
76. Id. § 12.
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foreign commerce. Congress' fundamental desire to protect foreign commerce
thus indicates that foreign governments should be included as "persons"
entitled to enforce the competitive norms of the antitrust laws through treble
damage suits.
This logic is augmented by decisions in other fields. In determining
whether the word "person" in other statutes includes governmental entities,
the courts have not confined themselves to narrow, technical meanings.

Rather, they have interpreted the word in accordance with the underlying
77
objectives which Congress sought to attain.
Congressional Use of the Word "Any". Section 4 of the Clayton Act states

that "any person" injured by a violation of the antitrust laws can bring
suit. 78 The breadth of the word "any" indicates -that the statute should be
given a broad reading. As the Supreme Court asserted in Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 79 when speaking of section 7 of
the Sherman Act, the predecessor of section 4 of the Clayton Act, "[tihe
statute does not confine its protection to consumers or to purchasers, or to
competitors, or to sellers .... [it protects] all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." 80
To give the statute a narrow reading which excludes foreign nations would

make them the only jural entities or persons which are proscribed from bringing damage suits. This hardly seems consonant with the use of the words "any

person" in section 4.
Suits by Foreign Corporations.As indicated above, the definition of "per77. See, e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944), which concerned the
definition of "person" under the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 801-42 (1970). That
definition parallels that of "person" under section 1 of the Clayton Act. The Federal
Maritime Commission sought to exercise jurisdiction under the Act against the State of
California and the City of Oakland. These governmental entities argued that they were
not "persons" within section 801 and accordingly were not subject to the Act. The
Court rejected that notion, stating:
We need not waste time on useless generalities about statutory construction
in order to conclude that entities other than technical corporations, partnerships
and associations are "included" among the "persons" to whom the Shipping Act
applies if its plain purposes preclude their exclusion. The crucial question is
whether the statute, read in the light of the circumstances that gave rise to its
enactment and for which it was designed, applies also to public owners of
wharves and piers. California and Oakland furnished precisely the facilities
subject to regulation under the Act, and . . .it would have defeated the very
purpose for which Congress framed the scheme for regulating waterfront
terminals to exempt those operated by governmental agencies.
320 U.S. at 585-86.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added).
79. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
80. Id. at 236.
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son" in section 1 includes corporations and associations organized under
foreign laws. Many foreign governments carry out their commercial activities, such as purchases from American companies, through governmentowned corporations organized under the laws ot the particular nations.
Unless a court is to disregard the clear meaning of the statutory wording,
these corporations would be "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages
under section 4.81 It would, therefore, be a totally incongruous result if suit
could be maintained when the foreign government has determined to carry
out its activities by organizing its purchasing entity in corporate form, but not
when it has organized the same purchasing institution in some other form,
such as a government agency. The anomaly is heightened becausd the
decision of how to organize the entity has nothing to do with American
antitrust laws, but only with factors such as funding, convenience, and local
law. The only way to avoid the incongruity is to include foreign governments
and their agencies as "persons" equally with the corporations which they
own.
C.

Arguments Against Including Foreign Governments

Treble Damage Suits by the United States. Foremost among the arguments
against holding that foreign governments are within the protection of the
antitrust laws is one derived from the Supreme Court's holding in Cooper
Corp. There the Court held that the 'United States Government was not a
person entitled to sue under section 4. From this result one might conclude
that foreign governments likewise are not persons for purposes of the
Clayton Act. However, just a year after Cooper, the Court in Georgia v.
Evans82 decided that a domestic state is a person for purposes of section 4
of the Clayton Act. Since a domestic state can recover even though it, like a
foreign state, is not specifically listed in the definition of "person" in section
1 'of the Clayton Act, the Evans decision militates against giving the word
"person" a narrow interpretation which excludes foreign nations.
More important, the Evans Court noted that the basis for the Cooper
holding was that the United States did not need a damage remedy, since it
already possessed far-reaching remedies for antitrust violations. The Court
noted that domestic states do not have the varied arsenal of antitrust
81. Even if a court were to disregard the plain meaning of the statute and rule that a
foreign government-owned corporation cannot sue because it partakes of the sovereignty
of its creator, one must wonder at what point such a bar would arise. Is the corporation
barred if it is 90 percent owned by the foreign government and 10 percent owned by
private parties; if it is owned 60 percent by the government and 40 percent privately; 25
percent by the government and 75 percent privately?
82. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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weapons possessed by the United States. Thus, unless a domestic state can
sue for damages, it would be "denfied] all redress . ..when mulcted by a
'8 3
violation of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a state."
A foreign government stands in no better position, and possibly in a worse
position, than a domestic state in combatting antitrust violations. It cannot
invoke a grand jury, initiate a prosecution, or seize assets in the United
States. Unless it is a "person" within the Clayton Act, it cannot sue for an
injunction under section 16 of the Act.8 4 Even more than a domestic state, it
lacks the ability to conduct an investigation in the United States. Thus, unless
it is held to be a "person" entitled to sue under section 4, it would be left
without remedies for antitrust violations. In short, the same considerations
which led the Evans Court to permit state treble damage actions support
permitting foreign governments to institute these suits.8 5
Mutuality of Suit. A further argument in opposition to permitting a foreign
government to sue as a "person" under the Clayton Act is that such a
government cannot in turn be sued for treble damages under the antitrust
laws. The syllogism that supports this position is: (1) to be a "person"
entitled to sue for treble damages, an entity must itself be a "person" liable
under the antitrust laws; (2) foreign governments are not liable under the
antitrust laws; (3) therefore, foreign governments are not "persons" entitled
to sue.
As with all syllogisms, the conclusion is only as sound as the premise and
here the premise-that only those who are themselves suable as defendants
may bring suit as plaintiffs-is fallacious. Antitrust jurisprudence has long
recognized that an entity may sue for treble damages even if it cannot be
sued for its own antitrust violations. This has been clear since Parker v.
83. Id. at 162-63. This may not be entirely true, since many states have their own
antitrust acts and could presumably invoke the provisions of the local act against antitrust
violators.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
85. The state analogy is perhaps strengthened when the position of American
municipalities is viewed. Municipal corporations have long been permitted to sue for
treble damages. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906). This is partly because they are "corporations . ..existing under or authorized
by the laws . .. of any State." 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970), within the scope of section 1 of
the Clayton Act. But at least as important, it would seem, is the fact that municipal
corporations are even more defenseless against federal antitrust law violators than are the
states which may have state antitrust statutes, since municipalities would normally lack
municipal antitrust laws. Thus at least one rationale for suits by municipal corporations,
their susceptibility to the depredations of antitrust violators, applies equally to foreign
nations, since foreign countries would be hard put to enforce their own statutory
remedies against violators.
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Brown,80 decided only a year after the Court in Evans permitted a domestic
state to sue for treble damages.
In Parker, California's Director of Agriculture was authorized by state law
to regulate the marketing of raisins within the state.8 7 Although private
raisin producers were members of the committee charged with formulating
the marketing plan, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
program was essentially private action. 88 It thus found that Brown's attack
on the program as an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act was an
attack on state regulation.8 9 The Court, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Stone, held that there was "nothing in the language of the Sherman
Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or
its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature,"9 0 and the
Court unanimously dismissed the antitrust claim. 91 Thus, the combined
result of Parker and Evans is that while states may not be sued for antitrust
offenses, they may bring suit against others for similar offenses. It is difficult
to see why domestic states would have this benefit while foreign states could
not.
Furthermore, there may be some real question as to whether a foreign
government is absolutely immune from suit under the antitrust laws. Total
immunity, that is, immunity even for actions taken in a commercial rather
86. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
87. Agricultural Producers Marketing Law, CAL. AGIuC. CODE §§ 59641-62 (West
1968).
88. 317 U.S. at 350.
89. Id. at 352.
90. Id. at 350-51.
91. Parker did not involve a particularly novel issue, see Handler, Twenty-Fourth
Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972), since both the Supreme Court
and lower courts had faced similar questions, and had drawn similar conclusions. In
Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895), a liquor merchant challenged South
Carolina's state liquor monopoly under the Sherman Act. The court held that the Act
applied only to private, not state, monopolies. In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904),
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a Texas statute which allegedly violated the
Sherman Act by prohibiting unlicensed ship pilots from competing with licensed pilots.
The Court held that "no monopoly . ..can arise from the fact that duly authorized
agents of the State . . .perform the duties devolving upon them by law," id. at 345, and
upheld the relevant portion of the Texas statute. It is worthy of note that, unlike Parker,
the Olsen case was a challenge to the acts of private persons.
More recently, on June 16, 1975, the Supreme Court dealt with the so-called state
action exemption in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court
ruled that the exemption did not apply to a minimum fee schedule for lawyers which was
published by a county bar association and enforced by a state bar association. The basis
of the ruling was that the fee schedule was not compelled by direction of the state acting
as a sovereign. Thus the conduct under attack was mere private anticompetitive activity
subject to the antitrust laws.
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than a sovereign capacity, rests on the concept of absolute sovereign
immunity, a concept discarded by the United States since the Tate letter of
1952.92 Today, the prevailing rule is that foreign sovereigns can be liable in
United States tribunals for commercial acts.93 It may therefore be quite
possible to recover against a foreign sovereign or foreign government corpo94
ration which has committed antitrust violations in a commercial capacity.
III.

FOREIGN NATIONS AS OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES

OF THEIR CITIZENS
The other major procedural issue raised in the Antibiotic Cases in
connection with foreign nations is the attempt by foreign governments to act
as the official representative of the treble damage claims of their citizens.
Similar to, but distinct from, parens patriae actions,9 5 the official representa92. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952 (26 Dep't State Bull. 984 (1952)),
quoted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 69, at 213-14 (1965).

93. Id.
94. Although older cases refused to apply the Sherman Act to commercial acts of
states, it is entirely possible that Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), would not shield
a domestic state from liability for antitrust violations committed while acting in a private
commercial capacity rather than a sovereign capacity. See Handler, supra note 91, at 1415; ci. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
69, at 213-14 (1965). If this is so, the clear inference is that foreign nations would not
be absolutely immune for antitrust violations committed in a commercial capacity and, to
this not inconsiderable extent, mutuality of suit would prevail.
It should also be noted that the act of state doctrine has been applied to preclude suits
on business actions forced upon private corporations by foreign governments. There are
two reasons for these rulings. First, application of domestic law to acts ordered by a
foreign nation might cause diplomatic difficulties with that nation and might intrude
upon the executive branch's primary role in foreign affairs. See Interamerican Ref. Corp.
v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). Second, if they wish to do
business in foreign lands, American businesses abroad must operate under the conditions
established by their foreign hosts. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.), afI'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
The first consideration is inapplicable to suits by foreign nations; diplomatic problems
would hardly occur when the nation itself has brought suit. Indeed, only the denial of
permission to sue could raise diplomatic difficulties. See pp. 9-10 supra. The second
reason-that a corporation's refusal to adhere to anticompetitive strictures of a foreign
nation would preclude it from doing business in that nation-is obviously irrelevant
when a foreign nation sues under American laws because of anticompetitive actions.
95. The term "parens patriae" is derived from two different contexts. In the first, it
referred to the royal prerogative which the English monarch exercised over charities and
incompetents. The second is of American derivation and was developed in the instance of
suit by a domestic state in a quasi-sovereign capacity in order to protect its own interest.
See Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust
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tive claim is a method under which the foreign nation will assert claims, and if
successful collect damages, for antitrust injuries suffered by its citizens in
their individual capacities.
The official representative suit is an effort to apply, in domestic judicial
tribunals, principles of recovery that long have been applied in international
judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals, as well as in international diplomatic
channels. In 'the international arena, nations regularly espouse their citizens'
claims, and the ultimate disposition of any monetary recovery is determined
by the internal law of the recovering country.9 6
A.

The Case For Official Representative Status

The fundamental reason for the existence of governments is to protect
the interests and welfare of their citizens. Thus, it long has been established
that a sovereign government may act as the official representative of its
citizens' claims in dealings with international organs and with instrumentalities of foreign nations.97 So ingrained is this right that the United States itself
has claimed the right to advance claims of its citizens without being
requested to do so, has espoused claims without the citizens even being
aware of it, and has asserted the right to espouse citizens' claims despite
"vigorous opposition" by 'the citizens themselves. 98
Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193, 196 (1970).
As one might well expect, the plaintiffs' bar views parens patriae actions as a boon to
consumer protection while the defendants' bar suggests that they are the source of much
mischief. Compare Alioto, Toward a More Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws:
Suits by the State as Parens Patriae, 1969 BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 12, with Handler, TwentyFive Years of Antitrust, 73 COLuM. L REV. 415, 423-24 (1973) and Malina & Blechman, supra at 223.
96. See pp. 32-33 infra.
97. In ruling that a state could represent its citizens in the Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions case, the Permanent Court of International Justice wrote that "[ilt is an
elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect its subjects,
when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another state, from
whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through ordinary channels." Greece v.
United Kingdom [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 12. See I. BROWNLIE, PINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973) ("Customary international law still maintains
the rule that it is the state which has the capacity to present international claims, even
though in many cases the claim is substantially that of a private person." Id. at 572).
98. Fabian A. Kwiatek, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims in the
Department of State, has stated that the government of the United States
can legally espouse on behalf of a national of the United States a formal claim
through diplomatic channels and/or submit the claims for adjudication by an
international arbitral tribunal without being requested to do so either formally
or informally by the aggrieved national.
A. ROVINE, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 332 (1973). Mr. Kwiatek
further said that such action can be taken by the United States despite "vigorous
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It is true that the practical and legal facts of international life have caused
official representative action to be taken mainly in the context of one nation
pursuing its citizens' claims against another nation. As a practical matter, it
can be most difficult for a private citizen to pursue a claim against a nation
by dealing with the latter's executive or legislative arms; as a legal matter,
under international law a private citizen has no standing to bring a case
against a nation before an international tribunal. Thus, the private citizen's
claim would die unremedied unless championed by that citizen's government.
The sovereign's right to represent its citizens' claims is not confined to claims
against another state, however, nor is a sovereign precluded from representing its citizens' claims in the courts of another country. On the contrary, as a
matter of case law, sovereigns can represent, and have represented, their
citizens' claims against private parties in the courts of other countries,
including courts of the United States. This, for example, is precisely what
was permitted by the Supreme Court in The French Republic v. Saratoga

Vichy Spring Co.,99 in which the Court pointed out that 'France was acting
predominantly in a representative capacity. 100 Similarly, in United States v.
Diekelman,' 0' the government of Prussia represented the claim of one of its
02
citizens against the United States before the American judiciary.
opposition" by the aggrieved national, and he pointed out that the United States has
settled many claims of its nationals against Eastern European communist countries
without the nationals even being aware that their claims were being resolved. Id. at 33234.

99. 191 U.S. 427 (1903).
100. The Court noted that "the French Republic has had no real interest in the
product of the springs for fifty years, and [that] it can have no such interest for thirty
years to come." Id. at 438. The Court thought the litigation was more accurately
described as one in which the foreign nation was "suing for the use and benefit of" some
of its citizens. Id.
101. 92 U.S. 520 (1875).
102. It has been asserted that there are two cases that bar the bringing of claims in
the courts in an official representative capacity. One of these cases is Diekelman. The
assertion regarding Diekelman is based on one portion of a sentence removed from
context: "Mhe claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by
suits in the courts, as of right, but by diplomacy, or, if need be, by war." Id. at 524.
When read in full context, it becomes clear that the Court held that a foreign government can represent its citizens in court in appropriate circumstances. The full context
is as follows:
One nation treats with the citizens of another only through their government. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. His
own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents his
appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sovereignty,
except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed. Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by the conduct of another nation, must seek redress through his own government. His sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting his claim, or it need not be considered.
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Moreover, logic supports the case precedents. Since it is well established
that a nation can represent its citizens' claims before the instrumentalities of
foreign governments, it is a common occurrence for other countries to
represent their citizens' claims before the executive and legislative branches
of the United States Government. Since under our three-branch system of
government the federal courts are as much an instrumentality of the
government as the other branches, there would be little reason to permit
foreign nations to represent their citizens' claims before the Executive and
Congress while denying them that benefit before the judiciary.
In addition, representative action is logically as appropriate against private
parties as against nations. Just as in the case of claims against nations, it can
be impossible as a practical matter for individual foreign citizens either to
deal effectively with private parties responsible for their injuries or to bring
claims far from their homes. Thus, as with claims against nations, the claims
of foreign citizens against private parties will die unremedied unless adopted
If this responsibility is assumed, the claim may be prosecuted as one nation
proceeds against another, not by suit in the courts, as of right, but by
diplomacy, or, if need be, by war. It rests with the sovereign against whom
the demand is made to determine for himself what he will do in respect to it.
He may pay or reject it; he may submit to arbitration, open his own courts
to suit, or consent to be tried in the courts of another nation....
.. . For all the purposes of its decision, the case is to be treated as one in
which the government of Prussia is seeking to enforce the rights of one of its
citizens against the United States in a suit at law, which the two governments
have agreed might be instituted for that purpose.
Id. at 524-25.
The second case is that of Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 350 F.2d 645 (7th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966), which involved internecine family warfare in
which Iraq tried to benefit itself and a paternal grandmother, whom it claimed to
represent, at the expense of the interest of five children living in Chicago, whom it also
claimed to represent but whose interests were in reality protected against Iraq's depredations by the First National Bank of Chicago upon appointment by the local probate
court.
The court did not permit Iraq to represent the claims. In the context of the case the
decision seems correct, particularly with regard to Iraq's desire to "represent" the five
children residing in Chicago. This is a far cry, however, from saying that a nation should
not be able to represent legitimately the claims of its citizens residing in its own country,
when such representation would benefit citizens whose claims would otherwise expire.
Furthermore, even the Iraq case recognized that representation of claims by a nation can
be appropriate when the nation has an obligation to its general public to bring the
claims. Foreign nations do feel political, legal, economic, and moral obligations to obtain
redress for widespread injuries to their citizens. Additionally, Iraq further cited a line of
domestic parens patriae cases as showing the type of interest a foreign nation must have
in order to represent its citizens' claims. Id. at 649. As discussed below, see pp. 28-30
infra, foreign governments seeking to represent their citizens' antitrust claims meet the
standards established by the parens patriae cases.
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by their governments. In championing these claims, sovereignties act in
pursuit of their right and duty to protect the interests of their citizens. 103
B.

ProtectingForeign Commerce and the Claims of Foreign "Persons"

As discussed previously, Congress intended the protection of the antitrust
laws to extend to the foreign commerce of the United States, and a foreign
national is clearly a "person" possessing a claim under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' 04 But since foreign nationals, businesses and citizens alike, often
find it impossible as a practical matter to bring an antitrust suit in the United
States, both the protection of foreign commerce and the claims of foreign
nationals will be thwarted unless a foreign nation is permitted to exercise its
inherent power to represent claims of its citizens.
C. The Case Against Official Representative Status-And Some Responses
A variety of reasons may be asserted for the position that a foreign
government cannot sue as the official representative of the antitrust claims of
its citizens. Among the reasons are that there has not been the requisite
injury to its business or property; that the foreign nation is suing improperly
as parens patriae and thereby is failing to observe the due process requirements of the class action rule; that the foreign government is impermissibly
seeking fluid recovery; and that the foreign government has not formally
expropriated its citizens' claims, allegedly a prerequisite to suing on them,
and should not be able to recover even if it had expropriated the claims.
Injury to Business or Property. Section 4 of the Clayton Act requires that
there be an injury to business or property in order to obtain treble damage
recovery. There is no doubt whatever that foreign nationals who are harmed
by violations of the antitrust laws are injured in their business or property
within the meaning of section 4 and have a claim for this injury. An official
representative suit literally represents the claims of these nationals, and their
injuries thus suffice to permit suit under the statutory test, just as an assignee
of an antitrust claim can sue on the basis of the injury to the business or
property of the assignor. 105 Indeed, the real question is not whether there is
103. See Statement of David Gantz, Office of Legal Adviser, State Department,
quoted in A. ROVINE, supra note 98:
The protection of nationals is not only the right, but the duty of the state, and
such action does not constitute intervention so long as the protecting state is
claiming rights . . .to which its nationals are entitled either under local law

or under minimum standards of international law.
Id. at 334.
104. See p. 5 supra.
105. As with a suit on an assignment, the question of who keeps the proceeds of a
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injury, but whether there will be effective means of obtaining recovery for
the injury. An official representative suit is undertaken precisely so that
there will be an effective means of recovery.
Distinguishing Official Representative Suits from Parens Patriae Actions.
It is incorrect to assert that suit by a sovereign foreign nation in an official
representative capacity cannot be undertaken because there could not be suit
in a parens patriae capacity. The two must be distinguished. The concept of
suit as parens patriae is indigenous to the power of domestic entities; its
development in American jurisprudence was for the express purpose of
allowing domestic states to protect their citizens. But it has not been utilized
as a limitation upon the power which sovereign foreign nations possess under
international law. That body of law has long recognized that a sovereign
government possesses the inherent capacity to act as the official representative of its citizens' claims.
The impropriety of limiting foreign nations by recourse to a body of
parens patriae law which has developed for the different purpose of suits by
domestic states is further demonstrated by other basic differences between
suits by foreign countries and those by domestic states. The international
legal rules allowing suits by nations representing their citizens, and the
customary international practice of permitting them, are irrelevant to domestic states. Principles of comity arguing for suits by foreign nations are also
irrelevant to domestic states. Denial of suit by foreign states can hinder
foreign relations, but the same is not true regarding domestic states. Citizens
of the United States can themselves bring antitrust suits on their own claims,
but as a practical matter many citizens of foreign nations often cannot. And
in order to protect the domestic economy against damage arising from
antitrust violations in foreign commerce, foreign governments should be
permitted to represent their citizens. The same is not true regarding domestic
states.
The Standards of the Parens Patriae Cases Are Met When a Foreign
Nation Represents the Claims of Its Citizens. Even if a foreign sovereign's
right to represent its citizens' antitrust claims were to be judged by the
standards of the parens patriae cases concerning domestic entities, a foreign
nation still should be able to sue. This is made clear by consideration of the
few cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed general parens patriae
representation; by the recent decision in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,106
involving a state's suit for antitrust damages to its general economy; and by
recovery is a wholly different one from whether there is an injury which forms the basis
of the suit. For a discussion of who keeps the proceeds, see pp. 32-33 infra.
106. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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those cases which have rejected parens patriae claims for out-of-pocket
damages suffered by citizens of domestic states.
Although infrequently discussed by the Supreme Court, the principles
enunciated in the cases permitting parens patriae actions indicate that foreign
nations would be permitted to sue on behalf of their citizens' antitrust claims.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon,10 7 a suit challenging a federal statute providing
funds to states with programs to reduce maternal and infant mortality, the
Court, although refusing to permit the state to sue as parens patriae, pointed
out that the United States could represent its citizens as parens patriae.' 0 '
Despite the different context, the Mellon rationale would seem to permit a
national sovereign, though a foreign one, to sue as parens patriae of its
citizens. Moreover, in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,1 09 the Court
permitted a state to sue as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens in an
antitrust case, because of the state's sovereign interest in the welfare of its
citizens. 1 0 Although that case involved only injunctive relief, not treble
damage claims, its principle could apply, for if Georgia was permitted to sue
to protect its sovereign interest, surely foreign nations, whose sovereign
attributes exceed those of domestic states, also have a recognizable sovereign
interest in their citizens' welfare.
Foreign nations suing on the antitrust claims of their citizens represent not
just a few citizens, but large numbers who have suffered injury because of
antitrust violations."' In effect, the foreign governments act as guardians of
these citizens' interests. The foreign governments have an independent
interest in the case, "an interest apart from that of the individuals affected." ' 1 2 This independent interest arises because the foreign governments
have a proprietary sovereign interest stemming from their loss of foreign
exchange funds due to purchases by themselves and their citizens at allegedly monopolistic prices, and because the foreign nations have an independent
sovereign interest in ensuring the welfare of their citizens. 1" 3 This interest in
their citizens' welfare "is a matter of grave public concern in which the State,
as the representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the
107. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
108. Id. at 486.
109. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
110. Id. at 447-52. Since Georgia owned a railroad, it also asserted a proprietary
interest in the suit. The Court, however, dismissed this argument as merely a "makeweight." Id. at 450.
111. See generally Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
112.

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).

113. See generally Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest, but one
14
which is immediate and recognized in law.""
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,115 the Supreme Court pointed out that the
cases established the right of a state to sue as parens patriae on behalf of its
citizens."" Thus, said the Court, the question was not whether Hawaii could
sue on 'behalf of its citizens; rather, the question was whether the particular
kind of injury claimed by the state, injury to its general economy, was
compensable. 17 The Court stated several reasons for rejecting the claim for
recovery for injury to the general economy. First, such injury would be
extremely difficult to measure; second, such a suit would open the door to
duplicative recoveries for the same injury." 18 The first recovery would be by
the state itself for the general economic damage it sustained. The second
recovery would be by individual persons who might later bring suit for the
specific injuries they sustained which, in the aggregate, comprise the state's
general economic injury. Finally, Hawaii's suit was regarded by the Court as
unnecessary because nothing prevented private individuals who sustained
losses from bringing suit. 1 9
Unlike the State of Hawaii, foreign governments suing on the claims of
their citizens are, by definition, not suing for injuries to their general
economy. Rather, they are suing for trebled compensatory damages arising
from out-of-pocket losses suffered by their citizens due to antitrust violations.
Such damages are standard in antitrust cases. While damages to the general
economy are difficult to measure and would give rise to duplicative recoveries, trebled compensatory damages for out-of-pocket losses are typically
measured in antitrust cases and give rise to no duplicative recoveries.
Furthermore, unlike the situtation in the Hawaii case, there is little realistic
possibility that injured foreign citizens or entities can bring suit on their own
behalf.
Adverse Precedent. There have been a few lower court cases ruling that
domestic states cannot sue as parens patriae for out-of-pocket damages
114. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
115. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
116. Id. at 257-60.
117. Id. at 259.
118. Id. at 263-64.
119. Id. at 265-66. The Court's view in this regard may not be entirely accurate after
its decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelyn, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), for if the injuries
sustained by individuals were small in amount, after Eisen they may as a practical matter
be precluded from bringing an antitrust suit with its attendant expense. On the other
hand, the practicability of suit may depend on how the courts define subclasses. See id. at
179-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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suffered by their citizens12 0 -"quite a different question from that presented in Hawaii"'121 -and one upon which the Supreme Court has not passed.
The lower court cases have been concerned that parens patriae cases lack
constitutional due process safeguards for property interests, such as notice for
absent class members; 1 22 that a parens patriae suit would not preclude a
later suit on the same claim by citizens since neither the Constitution nor the
class action rule permits the extinction of citizens' rights without necessary
procedural safeguards;123 and that there is no injury to business or property
24
as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act.'
However, these judicial concerns, even if correctly applied to purely
domestic actions (which is certainly debatable), are inappropriate in representative suits by foreign governments. First, it is at least open to question
whether antitrust defendants should be permitted to assert the "due process"
rights of absent foreign citizens, since the sole interest of antitrust defendants
is not to protect those citizens, but to destroy their right, or the right of their
government, to collect antitrust damages. To be sure, the Supreme Court
has not been very consistent in deciding the standing of a party to assert defenses which in effect are based upon the constitutional rights of others. In
some recent cases dealing with first amendment rights,1 25 the Court did not
26
permit such defenses. On the other hand, in Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacqueline,1
a massive class action alleging antitrust violations, the Court permitted the
antitrust defendants to prevail on the argument that failure to give notice
to all reasonably identifiable absent class members would deprive those
class members of property without due process of law.
120. See, e.g., California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Philadelphia Housing Authority v.

American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969), af 'd,
438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1970).
121. California v.Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973).
122. E.g., Philadelphia Housing Authority v.American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057, 1062-63 (E.D.Pa. 1969), ajf'd, 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1970).
See FED.R. Crv. P.23(c) (2), which provides inpart:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the Court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.
123. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (E.D.Pa. 1969), alf'd, 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1970).
124. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
125. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973).
126. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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It is difficult to reconcile the Court's reluctance to approve the assertion of
third-party rights in the acutely sensitive first amendment area with permitting the Eisen defendants to allegedly protect miniscule third-party property
rights. Nevertheless, the domestic cases are readily distinguishable from the
official representative actions of foreign governments. In the domestic parens
patriae cases the absent class members or the states could bring their own
class actions. The foreign citizens in foreign cases, however, cannot practicably bring suit; it is difficult even for their governments to meet the Rule 23
notice requirements. 127 Further, it is questionable whether it is appropriate
for a 'United States court to dictate to a sovereign government the method by
which it must protect its own citizens, that is, by a class action rather than by
a suit in its official representative capacity.
Even if a defendant were allowed to assert the alleged constitutional rights
of foreign citizens, the plain fact is that there are no such rights to assert.
The Constitution cannot and does not control the relationship between a
foreign state and its citizens. Under its own law, as well as international
law, a sovereign government can decide that it will litigate and recover upon
the claims which its citizens possess under international law or the law of
other nations, and that it will keep the proceeds of any recovery. 128 This is
done even by the United States, which is bound by its own Constitution in
regard to its relationships with its citizens. To assert that it cannot be done by
a foreign sovereign because the foreign national's antitrust claim is his own
property which receives protection from the American Constitution is to exalt
the Constitution over the foreign sovereign's own law in regard to defining
the sovereign's relationships with its own citizens. Not only would this be
improper, but in most cases it would not even protect the alleged rights of the
foreign citizens. Rather, it would destroy those rights by insuring that there is
little practical possibility that suit would be brought.
What has been said above also disposes of any fear that it is improper for
a recovery to be used by a foreign state itself. Not only does the United
States government itself sometimes keep such recoveries for its own use, but
the Constitution clearly does not prevent foreign governments from doing so
since it cannot regulate the property or other relationships between a
sovereign foreign nation and its citizens. 129 Furthermore, principles of
127. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(2), quoted in note 122 supra.
128. See authorities cited note 130 infra.
129. Indeed, were the constitutional situation otherwise, in cases in which a foreign
government itself intended to keep a recovery instead of distributing it to citizens whose
claims have been espoused, the United States would not be constitutionally justified in
paying claims of foreign nationals which their governments have asserted in international
tribunals or diplomatic channels.
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international law dictate that a foreign sovereign has absolute discretion in
determining what shall be done with a recovery which it obtains in a
representative capacity. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States and numerous international authorities have long
recognized that the state can treat a claim 'as its own when the damage is to
its national welfare and arises under foreign law.' 3 0
The fact, of course, is that recovery and use of a fund of damages by a
foreign nation will inure to the general benefit of its citizens, as exemplified
when a nation agrees, as at least one of the Antibiotic Cases' plaintiffs did, to
use a recovery to purchase medicines to 'be distributed to its people. Indeed,
the use of a recovery for public purposes has even been approved by one
court in regard to domestic states, albeit in a class action suit.' 1 '
There is also no possibility of later suit by foreign nationals on the same
claim, so there need be no fear of thwarting judicial efficiency or exposing
defendants to double liability on the same claim. For, as a practical matter,
most foreign nationals suffer from an inability to bring suit. And as a legal
matter, the bringing of suit by a foreign national can cut off its citizens' right
to bring suit themselves, since the foreign country can regulate its citizens'
property interests without regard to limitations imposed by the American
Constitution.
D. Official Representative Suits and Fluid Recovery
A successful suit in an official representative capacity will lead to the
recovery of a substantial fund of damages by the plaintiff foreign government. This has led to objections that the recovery would be a form of fluid
130.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

174, comment c at 526 (1965). See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 572; A. ROVINE,
supra note 98, at 332-34.
. Cf. United States v. Germany, 7 R.I.A.A. 119 (1924), in which the Mixed Claims
Commission wrote that when upon request a nation espouses its national's claim against

another nation, the espousing
nation's absolute right to control it is necessarily exclusive. In exercising such
control it is governed not only by the interest of the particular claimant but
by the larger interests of the whole people of the nation and must exercise an
untrammelled discretion in determining when and how the claim will be presented and pressed, or withdrawn or compromised, and the private owner will

be bound by the action taken.
Id. at 140.
Although it would occur with relative infrequency, it is possible that a foreign national
might wish to represent his own claim and obtain his own recovery. The individual's
government could, of course, permit this. But if the government refused to permit it, then
the principles discussed above require that the government prevail.
131. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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recovery, a technique of collecting damages in antitrust cases which the
Second Circuit found unauthorized in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,13 2 and
which the Ninth Circuit rejected in In re Hotel Telephone Charges.1 38
Assuming arguendo that fluid recovery is illegal in domestic cases because
of various difficulties in identifying and paying individual claimants and
because of the consequent creation of a substantial fund which will not go to
such claimants,13 4 still official representative suits by foreign nations should
be permitted in light of the international law principles which allow a
sovereign to obtain and keep damages on the claims possessed by its
individual citizens. Furthermore, recovery of a fund of damages by a foreign
nation simply does not involve the problems which have caused a few courts
to reject fluid recovery in cases brought by domestic parties. These cases
have been class actions13 5 in which a full scale trial is to be held without
giving notice to most members of the classes, which number in the millions.' 46 There is, of course, no provision in Rule 23 for a (b) (3) class action
trial without personal notice to class members who can be identified with
reasonable effort, and this has been a primary factor causing the courts to
1 87
reject fluid recovery.
Under the first stage of the fluid recovery method, a large fund of
damages would be created to finance the notification of millions of American consumers that they may have claims which also would be paid from the
fund. Claims would then be filed, processed, and paid from the fund, along
with counsel fees and general administrative expenses. The processing and
filing of millions of individual claims creates insuperable manageability
problems which also have been an important factor in the judicial rejection
of fluid recovery.' 38 Furthermore, because there also will be millions of
132. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
133. 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
134. But see Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
87 HIARv. L. REV. 426, 451, 454 (1973). Additionally, in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971), the court approved a settlement device which entailed fluid recovery.
135. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156
(1974).
136. The class in In re Hotel Telephone Charges numbered 40 million, while the
class of odd lot customers in Eisen was estimated by the district court to be six million,
of whom approximately two million were identifiable. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479
F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
137. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
138. In In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974), the court thought that
processing so many individual claims would be "intolerably time consuming," would
involve "a great variety of individual questions," and would be a "gigantic burden on the
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plaintiffs who will "have never heard of the case or for other reasons have
failed to file claims and have them processed,"' 18 9 the damage fund will
contain a tremendous surplus, and the "principal beneficiaries" of the case
"will be the attorneys for the plantiffs.' ' 140 For this reason, too, fluid
recovery has been rejected. The residue after all the payments for claims,
counsel fees, and administrative expenses were made would be slated for
some sort of related public purpose. But, as in Eisen, in which the public
purpose would have required the courts to establish brokerage commission
rates,' 4 ' the courts may not have the legal power to make the decisions
necessary to accomplish the suggested purpose. 1 42 And for this reason, as
well, fluid recovery has been rejected.
It is obvious that none of the foregoing circumstances and reasons which
have led to the rejection of fluid recovery in domestic cases is present in
antitrust suits instituted by foreign nations. Such suits, brought in an official
representative capacity recognized by international law, do not depend upon
the procedural requirements of the class action rule. They will present no vast
manageability problems created by the processing and filing of millions of
individual claims. Instead, the fund of damages will be used solely by the
plaintiff governments. The attorneys will not be the principal beneficiaries of
the fund, since the beneficiaries will be the foreign countries and their
citizens. And no court need make any decisions beyond its legal power in
order for a foreign nation to use the recovery to carry out public purposes.
Such purposes will be carried out under the foreign sovereign's own law.
E. The Alleged Need For Expropriation
The argument that a sovereign foreign government must formally expropriate the claims of its citizens before it can represent them appears to be
implicitly based on the notion that the government does not own the claims,
and therefore cannot sue on them, until it expropriates them. But whatever
its implicit basis, the argument is clearly wrong.
As previously indicated, international law gives a sovereign nation total
Court's resources beyond its capacity to manage or effectively control." Id. at 91. The
Court of Appeals in Eisen took essentially the same view. See 479 F.2d at 1016.
139. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
140. Id. at 1019.
141. See id.at 1011.
142. At the district court level, Judge Tyler thought that he had such authority, but
recognized that the proper way to accomplish any change in commission fees was "under
SEC supervision or at least with SEC approval." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D.
253, 265 (1971). However, the Court of Appeals felt that the district court did not have
authority to decide commission rates. 479 F.2d at 1011.
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discretion over whether to represent its citizens' claims,'1 43 and there is no

authority whatsoever for the proposition that a nation must first formally
expropriate them. Indeed, the alleged need for expropriation prior to
representation is wholly absurd, since it would mean that expropriation is the
necessary precursor every time a sovereign decides to assert the claims of its
nationals before an international body such as the World Court or before the
instrumentalities of another nation. Common sense and experience inform
one that this is simply not the way things are done.
'It is noteworthy that the argument of an alleged need for expropriation
has not been raised by the foreign citizens whose claims have allegedly been
"taken", as has occurred in cases in which the question of taking was
properly brought up. 144 Rather, here the argument is raised by antitrust
defendants who thereby seek to avoid liability to any party, be it the alleged
"takee" or the alleged "taker". In this respect, the result of the expropriation
argument is identical to the constitutional due process argument discussed
earlier; it is merely a means of seeking to retain monies obtained through
violation of law. Rather than protecting the claims of foreign citizens, it
would destroy the practical possibility that there could be any recovery for
most such claims.
Finally, in direct contradiction to the argument that recovery cannot be
had without a prior formal expropriation, it has also been argued that a
foreign government could not represent its citizens' claims even if it had
expropriated them. This argument runs as follows: ordinarily the act of state
doctrine would preclude an American court from examining the validity of a
foreign government's formal taking of the property of its citizens. However,
because a claim for antitrust damages is collectible only in the United States,
it constitutes property located in the United States. Since such property is
located in the United States, the act of state doctrine is inapplicable and an
American court can make its own determination as to whether to enforce
the formal taking. Here it should not be enforced because "confiscation of
assets has been said to be 'contrary to our public policy and shocking to our
sense of justice.' 145
This argument is wrong even aside from the fact that a foreign nation
need not expropriate claims in order to represent them. Even when property
located in the United States is expropriated by a foreign nation, American
courts will enforce the expropriation, without any need to rely upon the act
143. See notes 128-30 & accompanying text supra.

144. See, e.g., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
145. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 350 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 942 (1966).
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of state doctrine, if the expropriation is not inconsistent with American law
and policy. 146 Representative suit on antitrust claims by foreign nations is
consistent with the public policy or law of the United States because it is
specifically designed to carry out antitrust law and policy. As stressed before,
foreign nationals are "persons" with claims under section 4, but as a practical
matter usually cannot bring suits themselves to enforce their claims, and
therefore claims will go unremedied unless championed by their governments. Such preservative action thus comports with and carries out the
legislative policy which gave foreign nationals a claim in the first place and
which sought to protect United States foreign commerce.
Nor can it be maintained that representative suit should be denied as
contrary to American constitutional policy. The United States Constitution
cannot regulate the property relationships between foreign nations and their
citizens. Nor has it ever been suggested that the American Constitution can
or does prevent a sovereign foreign government from representing claims of
its citizens which would otherwise go unremedied. To prevent a sovereign
government from representing claims which would otherwise die would not
prevent the expropriation of valuable property. 147 Instead, such action
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAw OF THE

UNITED

§ 43, comment e at 142 (1965), in which it is stated:
General acts of a foreign state that purport to affect property or other interests
located or localized in the United States are not always refused effect by courts
in the United States. Courts have given effect to such acts where, after examination, they are found to be not inconsistent with the public policy or law of
the United States. In such a case the court does not apply the act of state
doctrine.
Of course, it is highly debatable as to whether a foreign citizen's antitrust claim is
located abroad, where the citizen lives, or in the United States, where suit can be
brought. American courts generally follow the rule that intangible property such as a
legal claim is located where it can be collected, but not all nations follow this rule. If it
were determined that the situs of antitrust claims is in the foreign nation in which the
foreign citizens who possess the claims live, then the act of state doctrine would clearly
bar a court from examining a foreign nation's decision to "take" its citizens' claims and
represent them in United States courts. Such a decision would be an action taken by a
foreign government in its own territory with respect to property located within its
territory and, in such circumstances, the act of state doctrine requires the court to honor
the foreign sovereign's decision.
147. Even in regard to property owned by American citizens, the United States
Constitution bars an alleged taking only when the property has value in the hands of its
owner. There is no offense when the property right has no value to its owner and
American courts have often permitted legislators to extinguish certain property interests
such as rights of reverter which have little value to their holders. See e.g., Trustees of
Township No. 1 v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955). Since property
interests of Americans can be totally extinguished in such circumstances, a fortiori the
Constitution cannot preclude a foreign government from bringing a representative suit to
prevent total extinction of the possibility of recovery on a claim which in effect has no
value to its owner because he has no practicable possibility of instituting his own suit.
STATES
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would itself destroy the value of the property by ensuring that suit in pursuit
of the claims will be impossible as a practical matter.
In sum, far from being contrary to our public policy, representative suit
furthers these goals. What should be seen as against our national interests is
the use of ill-founded arguments to avoid all liability for antitrust violations
that harm foreign nationals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The question of whether a foreign nation can sue under the antitrust laws
for damages suffered by itself and its citizens is both highly important and
intellectually interesting. It involves numerous vital points of antitrust law
and economics. Due to the great importance of the matter and the ongoing
litigation, judicial resolution of the issues may be expected in the near future.
In my judgment, an answer which allows suit by foreign nations would be
beneficial to the regime of competition which is the foundation stone of the
American economy.
ADDENDUM

The Eighth Circuit'sDecision On The "Person" And Official
Representative Issues
On August 27, 1975, while this article was being prepared for publication,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit delivered a decison
on the "person" and official representative issues after appeals from the
Minnesota district court's rulings.' 4 8 The Court of Appeals did not rule on
whether a foreign government is a "person" under the antitrust laws. Instead,
it said that this issue could not be brought before it by petition for writ of
mandamus, which was the procedural route utilized by the appellants after
the district court had refused to certify an interlocutory appeal on the
question. However, the Court of Appeals did decide the merits of the official
representative and parens patriae issues which were before it on certified
interlocutory appeal, ruling against the foreign governments. Since the
principal arguments supporting participation of foreign governments in
antitrust suits as official representatives have been set out in the body of this
article, this addendum will focus primarily on a description of the Eighth
Circuit's decision. There will be, however, limited comment in footnotes on
some of the more important aspects of the court's opinion.
The court, treating the official representative and parens patriae issues as
a single question, began its analysis by noting that parens patriae capacity
148. Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Lord, Civil No. 74-1680 (8th Cir., Aug. 27, 1975).
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had traditionally been limited to certain narrow areas. In the United States
the parens patriae prerogative allowed a state to sue for the general welfare
of its citizens at large in order to protect the state's quasi-sovereign interests.
According to the court, quasi-sovereign interests exist apart from the interests
of particular individuals who may be affected, and are different from the
state's proprietary interests. Suits to enforce such interests have generally
been limited to those involving the physical environment, as in suits to enjoin
nuisances such as interference with the flow of natural gas, diversion of
water or discharge of sewage, and have generally involved injunctive relief
1 49
rather than damages.
The separateness of a state's quasi-sovereign interests from the interests of
individuals was elaborated upon in a lengthy footnote devoted to a discussion
of Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co.'50 In that case,
Oklahoma sought to assert the right of shippers against a common carrier
and it was not allowed to do so because it was not asserting wrongs to its own
powers or injuries to its own property, but was seeking to recompense damage
done to some of its people.
The court next noted that the interest relied upon by the foreign governments was different from those previously recognized in parens patriae suits.
The foreign governments, it ruled, were not asserting a quasi-sovereign
interest but rather were only seeking to protect proprietary interests which
would seem to give them standing to bring a class action on behalf of their
citizens. As to a foreign government's ability to bring such an action, the
court assumed, without deciding, that a foreign government would be a
"person" under the antitrust laws.
Although the foreign governments had asserted that a class action is not
financially feasible under the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen, the court
stated it would not expand the concept of parens patriae to enable foreign
governments to sue on behalf of persons who are legally entitled to sue but
unable to do so as a practical matter, basing its decision on the fact that
domestic states have not been permitted to bring such suits in recent
decisions, and that, in the Hawaii decision, the Supreme Court expressed a
strong preference for class actions. In support of this view, the Eighth Circuit
149. While the court's discussion of the historical use of suits to protect quasisovereign interests is certainly correct, it is difficult to understand how such an action
would not lie when the sovereign is attempting to protect its citizens in their obtaining
and paying for life-giving medicines. It would seem clear that whether the government is
protecting the physical environment or the individual citizen, it is acting to guard the
public health and welfare. Whether it does so by seeking an injunction to prevent injury
or damages to redress injury should not determine the ability to bring suit.
150. 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
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extensively quoted language from Hawaii stating that private citizens are not
powerless to bring antitrust actions and that class actions are preferred to
parens patriae cases in the antitrust area because Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides rules regarding the appropriate class and
also prevents duplicate recoveries.
In further support of this preference for class actions, the Eighth Circuit
quoted extensively from a decision by Judge John Lord of Philadelphia,' 51
who said that parens patriae actions would in various ways allow states to
circumvent the restrictions to which class action plaintiffs are subject under
Rule 23, and would undermine the aims of the rule by negating its
safeguards for absent parties.' 52 The Eighth Circuit indicated that these
decisions regarding domestic entities are not inapplicable merely because the
plaintiffs are foreign governments. In the court's view, principles of comity,
international law, and treaties do not afford foreign parties access to
American tribunals on a different or more favorable basis than is granted to
domestic parties. 1 53 Rather, foreign parties should be afforded only the same
access as American entities and, as the Supreme Court observed in the 1883
case of New Hampshire v. Louisiana,"4 no principle of international law
requires a nation to assume the collection of its citizens' claims against
another nation if the citizens themselves have ample redress. 155
In addition, the appellate court indicated that the district court may have
been in error in ruling that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
does not entitle foreign nationals to notice and an opportunity to participate
in or exclude themselves from the litigation. While the court agreed that the
American Constitution cannot bind foreign governments in their relationship
with their nationals, it noted that nonresident aliens nonetheless may be
entitled to due process when their rights to property located in the United
States are litigated in American courts. However, the court stated that it was
unnecessary to decide the due process question since, when foreign governments invoke the aid of American courts to deal with tangible or intangible
151. The cited case was Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969), af 'd, 438 F.2d 1187 (3d
Cir. 1970).
152. 309 F. Supp. at 1063.
153. The court also recognized, however, that foreigners must not be given inferior
access. This raises an interesting legal point in light of activity in Congress toward
legislation which would allow domestic states to sue as parens patriae for antitrust
injuries suffered by their citizens. Should such a bill be enacted, the principles recognized
by the Eighth Circuit would seem to grant foreign sovereigns the right to sue as parens
patriae as well.
154. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
155. Id. at 90.
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property located here, their actions will be upheld only if consonant with
American law and policy. Taking the Supreme Court's preference for class
actions in Hawaii and its delineation of exacting notice requirements under
Rule 23 in Eisen as indicative of United States policy, the court held that it
would be inconsistent with United States law and policy to permit a parens
patriae action even if the cost of a class action would be prohibitive and would
56
render the claims unenforceable.'
In conclusion, the court stated that the remedy plaintiffs desire, if it can be
made available at all, must come from Congress, since Congress is best able
to weigh the economic and political consequences and to consider alternative
means of enforcing the antitrust laws. In this regard, the court quoted
extensively from the Second Circuit's opinion in Eisen,15 7 in which Judge
Medina said that statements about "disgorging" money from wrongdoers or
about "prophylactic effects" or about "providing a remedy for the ills of
mankind" do not solve specific legal problems, and that punishment of
wrongdoers is provided for in particular ways and should not be done by
watering down procedural safeguards of the Constitution, statutes or Rule 23
since such procedural safeguards are an important protection against oppression.
The Eighth Circuit ended, however, by noting that nothing in the opinion
should be construed to prevent the foreign nations from representing their
citizens in a class action if the district judge determines that a class should
be certified, and by ordering dismissal of the official representative and parens
patriae claims.

156. In so defining United States policy, the Eighth Circuit expressed a preference for
upholding procedural requirements to the detriment of important substantive policies
contained in the antitrust laws. Since a decision in favor of the foreign governments
would have been clearly consistent with antitrust law and policy, it must be questioned
whether it is either proper or permissible for courts to favor procedural requirements
over substantive law when the result is not to protect property but, as here, to negate the
value of property since the small size of the individual claims coupled with other
considerations means that no recovery will be had by any of the wronged parties.
157. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).

